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The Australian carbon pricing experience: 
are there any lessons for Japan? 
Abstract 
In 2010 the Japanese Government made substantial commitments to the reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions.  In particular it proposed a 25% reduction on 1990 levels by 2020 and an 80% 
reduction by 2050.  At the forefront of this policy was to be an additional (carbon) tax on fossil 
fuels, strategies to promote renewable energy (in particular a feed-in tariff) and an emissions 
trading scheme. Notoriously there was to be greater reliance on nuclear energy.   
Subsequent events conspired to derail these plans.  The Fukushima power station disaster forced 
the Government to reconsider nuclear power.  Continued global economic uncertainty, together 
with the damage to the economy caused by the March 2011 tsunami, resulted in the deferral of 
the introduction of the emissions trading scheme. 
Meanwhile on July 1, 2012 the Australian Government introduced a hybrid carbon tax / 
emissions trading scheme putting it at the cutting edge of climate change response using fiscal 
measures.  However the path to the introduction of this regime was not easy and its future is not 
assured.  Whilst Australia had been active in negotiating the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and an early 
signatory, during the subsequent decade the Liberal coalition Government refused to embrace a 
price on carbon, the centerpiece of the Protocol, even questioning the science on climate change.  
With the election of a Labor Government in 2007 the Kyoto Protocol was promptly ratified and 
an emissions trading scheme proposed. However the proposal met neither the expectations of 
environmentalists nor industry and in 2010 it was shelved upon failing to pass through 
Parliament for a third time. Although it seemed that the impetus had been lost, with the toppling 
of a Prime Minister later that year and a Federal election resulting in Labor forming a coalition 
with the Greens, momentum again swung in favour of an emissions trading scheme. 
Meanwhile the Liberal coalition Opposition remains divided as to the approach it would adopt if 
it wins government in the elections scheduled for late 2013.  Having dismissed one party leader 
for promoting an emissions trading scheme, the current policy of the party is that it would repeal 
the Government’s scheme and focus on emissions reduction strategies requiring other than a 
fiscal response.   
There may be political economy lessons for the rest of the world, including Japan, in how the 
carbon tax / emissions trading scheme was designed and implemented in Australia.  This paper 
explores the developments in Australia.  It is hoped that Japanese policy analysts might find the 
Australian experience informative. 
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The Australian carbon pricing experience: 
are there any lessons for Japan? 
Introduction 
If the scientists are correct our World is on the edge of a precipice brought about by climate 
change. Every country, indeed, humanity faces an uncertain future.
1
 
For Australia, already the driest inhabited continent on Earth,
2
 the implications of global 
warming and the extreme weather forecasts are frightening. Whilst the important primary 
production industry has an uncertain future in the face of changing weather patterns,
3
 with 85% 
of the population coastal dwellers,
4
 rising sea levels will directly affect much of the population. 
The anticipated destruction of Great Barrier Reef before the end of the century and erosion of the 
country’s World renowned beaches will impact harshly on tourism and the cherished quality of 
life of the Australian population. Apart from those island nations that will simply cease to exist
5
 
few countries may be as adversely impacted by climate change as Australia. 
It could, therefore, be anticipated that Australia would be at the forefront of efforts to reduce 
manmade emissions of carbon considered by most scientists to be cause of the problem that is 
climate change. However, huge distances between population centres, necessitating long distant 
transport, together with sprawling cities, have conspired to render Australia the greatest emitter 
                                                 
1
 It is not proposed to canvass the scientific debate in this paper. This has been performed admirably by others. For 
example, see Lidia Xynas, “Climate change mitigation: carbon tax – is it the better answer for Australia?” 
Australian Tax Forum 26 (2011): 339 – 347. 
2
 See http://www.about-australia.com/facts/ (last visited 11 November 2012). 
3
 B. L. Preston and R. N. Jones, Climate change impacts on Australia and the benefits of early action to reduce 
global greenhouse gas emissions, CSIRO February 2006 available at http://www.csiro.au/files/files/p6fy.pdf (last 
visited 11 November 2012). 
4
 The Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year book of Australia 2004 available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article32004?opendocument&tabna
me=Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2004&num=&view= (last visited 11 November 2012). 
5
 For example, see Bill Blakemore, “Micronesia: A third kind of Nation, Written off?”, ABC News, 9 December 
2009 available at http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/global-warming-micronesia-island-nations-threatened-sea-
level/story?id=9280340 (last visited 11 November 2012). 
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of carbon per head of population in the developed World.
6
 Furthermore, its vast reserves of coal, 
and the vital extractive industry that these reserves support, provide no incentive to see the use of 
coal reduced, albeit that coal powered electrical generation is one of the World’s primary sources 
of manmade carbon emissions.
7
 
So the country has faced a conundrum. The quality of life of its inhabitants demands that climate 
change be tackled. Yet any measures focused on the reduction of carbon emissions will require 
both fundamental changes to the economy and to the entrenched behavior of the population. 
Furthermore, as a relatively small country in terms of population the impact of any carbon 
emission reductions in the global context might be almost negligible
8
 yet as a price taker in 
global markets its industry needs to remain competitive. 
Apart from (initial) contention over the science and reality of human induced climate change it is 
these considerations that have been at the heart of the debate in Australia as to the appropriate 
response to global warming. 
It is proposed in this paper to examine the events that have led to the introduction in Australia of 
a price on carbon. It will be seen that 2007 was a watershed year when, for the first time, both 
major parties acknowledged the need for a fiscal response. However the path to the subsequent 
introduction of an emissions trading scheme (“ETS”) was rocky and there may be lessons in the 
experience for other nations considering or embarking upon a similar journey. It is hoped that 
this contribution to the literature might assist the Governments of these nations in negotiating the 
process. 
1. Climate change response – the policy alternatives 
Once it is accepted that manmade carbon emissions need to be reduced a number of Government 
initiated strategies are possible. First, there are regulatory measures ranging from prohibitions on 
the use of particular energy sources through to incentives to adopt more energy efficient 
practices and look to renewable energy solutions. It is this direct measures approach that the 
Australian Liberal coalition Opposition supports. Indeed the current Government already has 
many such measures in its suite of responses.
9
 
                                                 
6
 Climate Commission, The critical decade: international action on climate change, Commonwealth of Australia 
2012 available at www.climatecommission.gov.au  (last visited 5 October 2012) 13 - 19. 
7
 Coal amounts for around 75% of Australia’s electricity generations: Climate Commission, The critical decade, 15. 
8
 Although, according to the Climate Commission, Australia is the 15
th
 largest emitter (larger than around 180 other 
countries): Climate Commission, The critical decade, 14. 
9
 See the discussion in Xynas “Climate change mitigation: carbon tax – is it the better answer for Australia?”, 375 – 
382. 
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The more controversial response is the proposal to place a price on carbon emissions. The Kyoto 
Protocol endorses such an approach as the most cost effective.
10
 There is, however, nothing new 
in this concept. For decades economists have promoted the idea of internalizing the costs of 
external or public goods, of which air quality is one example.
11
 This movement was probably at 
its zenith during the 1970s when air pollution in developed nations was increasingly a concern. 
Then, and even more so now in a more globalised market, a central concern with such measures 
is the potential to drive industry offshore to escape the competitive disadvantage generated by 
the added cost burden. In carbon pricing parlance the expression “carbon leakage” has been 
coined to refer to the phenomenon where origin based carbon pricing leads to a reorientation of 
carbon emitting activities away from countries that price carbon to destinations that do not. 
For those countries that look to implement a carbon pricing mechanism, essentially there are two 
choices: a tax on carbon emissions or a market mechanism whereby a cap is placed on the 
amount of carbon that the country should emit (in line with its ultimate goal of achieving its 
Kyoto obligations) and permits to emit carbon can be traded. Under such a “cap and trade” 
system permits might be both issued by the Government and, effectively, created by entities 
trapping carbon. 
The respective advantages and disadvantages of these alternative approaches have been the 
subject of much debate, one which it is not appropriate to engage in this paper. Suffice to say that 
a major deficiency in the carbon tax approach is the lack of a cap – conceivably the amount of 
carbon emissions could stay the same or even rise with the added cost simply passed on to 
consumers. The setting of the tax rate (ie. the carbon price) would also be problematic for 
governments. Too low and nothing is achieved. Too high and the economy might be significantly 
damaged.
12
  
Whilst a market based “cap and trade” scheme avoids these limitations such regimes suffer from 
the unknown and complexity. The negative impact on investment planning arising from the 
uncertainty as to the future carbon price, difficulties in fairly allocating carbon credits and the 
potential for speculation and corrupt market practices also have the potential to derail their 
effectiveness.
13
 
                                                 
10
 Generally see http://unfccc.int/2860.php (last visited 12 November 2012).  
11
 Taxes used to internalize negative externalities are referred to as Pigovian taxes: A. Sandmo, “Optimal taxation in 
the presence of externalities” Swedish J. Econ 77(1) (1975): 86. 
12
 For a discussion of the difficulties of setting a carbon tax rate and a possible solution see: De Villemeur and 
Leroux, “CO2: Tax now, Pay later!”, 49. 
13
 Lidia Xynas comprehensively canvasses the opposing arguments in relation to carbon taxes and emission trading 
schemes concluding that a carbon tax is preferable: Xynas, “Climate change mitigation: carbon tax – is it the better 
answer for Australia?”, 352 - 370. For a similar conclusion see Jim Corkery, “A carbon tax – onwards” Revenue 
Law Journal 19(1) (2009): 1 - 8. 
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In the absence of a global co-ordinated regime either mechanism has to deal with the 
international environment. Carbon leakage, as described above, is a real threat. The typical 
policy response is to introduce a border adjustment tax that seeks to tax the underlying amount of 
carbon emissions reflected in imports from destinations without pricing mechanisms.
14
 Apart 
from the obvious difficulties in setting the rate of tax and identifying the amount of indirect 
carbon emissions there is a concern that such taxes may violate international trade rules, and, in 
particular, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”).15 For an ETS a further 
issue is as to whether and what permits issued by foreign countries should be recognized. If 
foreign carbon markets are not available to domestic entities then a higher domestic market price 
compared to other countries (as would be expected if other markets were larger) might lead to 
carbon leakage. Recognizing foreign permits exposes the country to integrity issues which might 
be problematic for its carbon regulator to resolve. 
2. Australia’s path to a price on carbon 
International agreement on climate change dates back to the early 1990s. In Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil in 1992, 166 countries signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”) agreeing to work towards stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere.
16
 This Convention set no mandatory limits but in December 1997 the parties 
adopted the Kyoto Protocol, under which developed countries collectively committed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels during 2008 to 2012.  
Working alongside the Kyoto Protocol have been the United Nations climate change 
conferences. Since the 2010 session at Cancun (Mexico) though, countries have begun pledging 
to limit or reduce their emissions. These countries include Australia which has pledged to reduce 
its emissions by 5% compared with 2000 levels by 2020.
17
 Whilst it is difficult to compare the 
various pledges, Australia’s Climate Commission has suggested that Australia’s commitment is 
broadly comparable to other countries, in particular the targets of the United States, Japan, 
Europe and China.
18
 
                                                 
14
 An alternative response is the issuing of free carbon permits to trade exposed industries, which presents its own 
difficulties as a policy solution. 
15
 An alternative might be to encourage non-abating exporting countries to impose a carbon tax on their exports, 
encouraged by the realization of an additional revenue flow that might otherwise go to abating countries in the form 
of border adjustments. 
16
 www.unfccc.int (last visited 5 October 2012). There were 195 signatories as at that date. 
17
 Australia is prepared to adopt a target of 25% reductions under strict conditions relating to significant global 
action. 
18
 Climate Commission, The critical decade, 28. 
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2007 is year zero for climate change response in Australia. As at the start of the year the Liberal 
coalition Government had been in power for just over 10 years during which time it had refused 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol or establish a comprehensive greenhouse gas reduction strategy. 
Finally, following the final report of the Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading, all 
but the diehards in the Government accepted the science of climate change and the Government 
committed the country to a carbon trading scheme.
19
 The Labor Opposition had also 
commissioned the Garnaut Climate Change Review earlier in the year.
20
 The result was that both 
major parties went to the November 2007 election with a promise to introduce carbon trading.  
The subsequent election of a Labor Government was viewed as a mandate from the people to 
deal with climate change, which the new Prime Minister had said was the “greatest moral 
challenge” facing the country on which he was committed to act. Indeed one of the 
Government’s first acts was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In the euphoria of the moment the 
introduction of a carbon price in Australia seemed assured. 
There followed during 2008 a number of reports and Government papers teasing out the details 
of how an ETS might be implemented and seeking community input.
21
 This fostered 
considerable public debate and political lobbying which extended throughout 2009. The 
Government faced the difficulty that, although it had a large majority in the lower house, the 
peculiarities of the Australian federal electoral system were that conservatives continued to 
control the Senate. Thus it was necessary for it to negotiate to ensure passage of its legislation. 
Against this political reality the Government introduced a Bill into Parliament on May 14, 2009 
                                                 
19
 Available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/tep/72614 (last visited 5 October 2012). 
20
 The 2008 report and 2011 update can be found at: http://www.garnautreview.org.au/ (last visited 5 October 2012). 
Garnaut supports an ETS over a carbon tax provided that it is not too heavily compromised. 
21
 Including the Garnaut Review, Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Green Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Department of Climate Change, 16 July 2008 available at 
 http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/reduce/~/media/publications/cprs/greenpaper.pdf (last visited 5 
October 2012), Australia's Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation, Treasury and 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia’s low pollution future, White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, 15 
December 2008 available at 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/102841/20090728-0000/www.climatechange.gov.au/whitepaper/report/index.html 
(last visited 5 October 2012). 
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to enact an emissions trading scheme termed the “carbon pollution reduction scheme” 
(“CPRS”).22  
However as a negotiated compromise the scheme failed to meet the expectations of 
environmentalists nor be acceptable to industry. There were too many exclusions, free permits 
and a particular problematic feature allowing for the acquisition of cheap permits from the 
developing World as a substitution for emission cuts. Furthermore, uncertainties remained and 
the complexity of the regime made it difficult to sell to the community. A foreshadowed low 
fixed permit price of $10 AUD per tonne in the first year of operation raised the spectra that the 
scheme would create a mere revenue churn that would not be effective in achieving its 
environmental objectives.  
Nevertheless, successful negotiations with the leader of the Liberal coalition in November 2009 
seemed to ensure the safe passage of the Bill. However the inability of the Opposition leader to 
bring the remaining climate change skeptics within his party onboard saw him imprudently issue 
an ultimatum leading to his ousting as leader.
23
 His replacement, a climate change skeptic 
himself, led the Senate to reject the Bill for a second time.
24
  
Whilst the Bill was reintroduced into Parliament in 2010, public weariness of the issue together 
with an increasing reluctance to embark on any initiative whose impact on the economy was 
potentially negative at a time of continuing global economic instability, induced the Prime 
Minister to announce that resolution of the country’s greatest moral challenge would be deferred 
                                                 
22
 Issued first as an exposure draft for public consultation on 10 March 2009, then as a Bill on 14 May 2009 (see 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:legislation/billhome/R4127) which, 
following its failure to pass the Senate, was reintroduced in 2010 but subsequently lapsed upon Parliament rising for 
the calling of a general election (see  
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:legislation/billhome/R4281). 
23
 In December 2009 Malcolm Turnbull was replaced by Tony Abbott after the former had instructed his colleagues 
that they should support the Government’s emission trading proposal. See: Matthew Franklin, “Malcolm Turnbull 
sharpens the knife” The Australian (November 26, 2009) available at 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/politics/malccolm-turnbull-sharpens-the-knife/story-e6frgczf-1225803954519 (last 
visited 5 October 2012) and “Shock win for Abbott in leadership vote” ABC News (1 December 2009) 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-12-01/shock-win-for-abbott-in-leadership-vote/1163910 (last visited 5 October 
2012). 
24
 On 2 December 2009. 
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until such time as greater World consensus was reached.
25
 His subsequent inability to achieve 
passage of an equally controversial piece of legislation enacting a special mining tax was to see 
him replaced as leader in June 2010. Reading the community’s fatigue with the issue his 
successor, Prime Minister Gillard, went to the August election under a no carbon tax platform. 
26
 
With the Opposition leader publicly doubting the science of climate change both major 
Australian political parties had dramatically retreated from a policy to impose a price on carbon 
in three short years. A highly popular Prime Minister and well regarded leader of the Liberal 
coalition Opposition had been dethroned in the process. 
Nevertheless, a massive swing against the Government was to see it only retain office with the 
help of independents and the Greens as part of a power sharing agreement. This was a game 
changer. Carbon pricing was back on the agenda.  
3. The 2012 Australian ETS 
In fulfillment of the Labor Government’s power sharing agreement with the Greens a Multi-
party Climate Change Committee was established to determine the exact way this would be 
delivered. Fundamental design issues had to be negotiated in a highly charged atmosphere. 
Business and right wing lobby groups were fuelling the Opposition attacks.
27
 Pledges in blood 
that the regime would be repealed when they were returned to office,
28
 calls for a national 
                                                 
25
 Announced 27 April 2010. See “Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme” (Press release), Australian Government 
Department of Climate Change and Energy, 5 May 2010 available at www.climatechange.gov.au/en/media/whats-
new/cprs-delayed.aspx (last visited 5 October 2012).  
26
 Although the Government argues that an ETS was not ruled out. The difficulty is that these semantics seem to 
have been lost on the Australian population who generally believe that the Prime Minister was not truthful with 
them: see, for example, D. Atkins, “Carbon tax plan is do or die for Prime Minister Julia Gillard” The Courier-Mail 
(11 July 2011) available at www.couriermail.com.au/spike/columnists/carbon-tax-plan-is-do-or-die-for-prime-
minister-julia-gillard/story-e6frerff-1226091892661 (last visited 5 October 2012). 
27
 See for example the criticism referred to in Randall Jackson, “Gillard announces carbon tax” Tax Notes 
International 61 (March 7, 2011): 729. However it should be acknowledged that some business leaders actually 
welcomed the introduction of a carbon tax preferring to see Australia not fall behind the rest of the world and 
encouraged by the end to the uncertainty it would bring: Randall Jackson, “Australian mining giant calls for carbon 
tax” Tax Notes International 59 (Sept 27, 2010): 1002. 
28
 Randall Jackson, “Australia. Lower house passes carbon tax bills” Tax Notes International 65 (October 17, 2011): 
177. 
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plebiscite on its introduction
29
 and attempts to arrest power from the Government in the lower 
house
30
 were all part of the attack. On the other side, environmental lobby groups were 
demanding a price that internalized the full cost of carbon pollution and an end to contradictory 
policies (such as assistance to polluting industries).
31
 Even actors
32
 and State politicians
33
 entered 
into the fray. 
The Government’s primary mechanism for galvanizing community support and introducing 
credible evidence to support its policy was to establish, as part of the Department of Climate 
Change and Energy Efficiency, a Climate Commission empowered to lead the national debate on 
the implications of climate change and the appropriate response. As at August 2012 the 
Commission had been very active, having issued 12 reports, primarily focusing on the need for 
strong rapid action and the steps Australia could take.
 
 
In February 2011 the Prime Minister announced the broad features of a resurrected ETS based on 
the recommendations of the Multi-party committee.
34
 However the precise details remained fluid 
with further refinement present in the draft legislative package issued for comment in July 2011 
                                                 
29
 Kristen A. Parillo, “Opposition leader seeks plebiscite on carbon tax” Tax Notes International 62 (June 27, 2011): 
1011. 
30
 Power is split 76/74 with the Government required to provide a speaker. One Government member has been 
facing possible criminal charges which have presented the possibility that he might need to vacate his seat. The 
support of the Independents has also not always guaranteed. An attempt by the Government to improve their 
position by persuading one of the Opposition members to be speaker backfired when allegations of improper 
behavior forced that member to step down and the Government was required to provide a speaker from its own 
ranks. 
31
 David D. Stewart, “Think tank calls for coherent climate change tax policies” Tax Notes International 61 
(February 21, 2011): 553. 
32
 Randall Jackson, “Cate Blanchett panned for promoting carbon tax” Tax Notes International 62 (June 6, 2011): 
763. 
33
 See for example the threat by the New South Wales Treasurer to increase the state mining royalty tax (which 
increase would be reimbursed to the mining companies by the Federal Government in his view) to offset the effect 
of the carbon tax: Kristen A. Parillo, “Australian Feds, State tussle over mining tax” Tax Notes International 64 
(Sept 12, 2011): 779. 
34
 See the press release and attachments at http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/climate-change-framework-
announced (last visited 11 November 2012). 
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and the subsequent bills presented to Parliament in September 2011,
35
 with even further changes 
made leading up to the 1 July 2012 commencement of the scheme.
36
 
The regime as introduced can be outlined as follows:
37
 
 the top 500 “large” emitters of carbon dioxide are to purchase an eligible emissions 
unit (“EEU”) for each tonne of carbon dioxide emitted each year from facilities over 
which they have operational control (with no cap imposed),
38
 
 
                                                 
35
 The legislative package included four main bills: The Clean Energy Bill 2011 (which set up the carbon price 
mechanism); The Clean Energy Regulator Bill 2011 (which established a regulatory body to administer the 
mechanism); The Climate Change Authority Bill 2011 (which established a new Authority to advise the Government 
on the future design of the carbon price mechanism) and The Clean Energy (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2011. 
Generally see http://www.climatechange.gov.au/media/whats-new/clean-energy-legislative-package.aspx (last 
visited 11 November 2012). Also see the Government’s comprehensive plan Securing a clean energy future: the 
Australian Government's climate change plan issued in July 2011 and available at http://www.pm.gov.au/press-
office/securing-clean-engergy-future-australia (last visited 11 November 2012). The Government maintains a 
website to promote its plan and keep the community abreast of developments: www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au (last 
visited 11 November 2012). 
36
 For example, see the Clean Energy Legislation Amendment Act 2012 available at 
 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012A00084. 
37
 The central piece of legislation is the Clean Energy Act 2011. Passed by a majority of 74 to 72 in the lower house 
and 36 to 32 in the upper house. The legislation received Royal assent in December 2011. A detailed summary of 
the legislation and surrounding issues is available in the Bills Digest no. 68 2011–12 available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd1112a/12bd068 (last visited 11 November 
2012). 
38
 And certain waste facilities emitting 10,000 tonnes per year. Notably some businesses not liable under this scheme 
are also to be subject to an equivalent carbon price through reductions to the fuel tax credits arrangements. Whilst 
the Government estimates that around 60% of Australia’s emissions will be covered by the ETS with other measures 
there will be a carbon price effectively imposed on 2/3rds of all emissions: Australian Government, Carbon pricing 
mechanism: who is liable?, 
 http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/500-companies/ (last visited 30 October 2012). 
12 
 
 those entities affected are to report carbon emissions for a financial year to the Clean 
Energy Regulator
39
 whose function is to ensure the accuracy of these reports and 
impose penalty unit shortfall charges if insufficient EEUs are purchased,
40
  
 
 the EEU price is fixed until 1 July 2015, for the first year at $23 AUD per tonne and 
then rising at 2.5% pa in real terms, purchased from the Government
41
 and 
immediately surrendered
42
 (hence the measures are more accurately a carbon tax for 
the first 3 years), 
 
 from 1 July 2015 the fixed price EEUs are to be replaced by a “cap and trade” ETS 
whereby any gains or losses will be on revenue account from an income tax 
perspective (and not subject to GST), 
 
 industry and household assistance is made available: free EEUs are to be issued to 
certain trade exposed activities for the first five years
43
 and coal-fired electricity 
suppliers
44
 and tax cuts, pension increases and other compensatory government 
payments are implemented.
45
 
 
                                                 
39
 By 31 October. The Climate Change Authority is to monitor the regime and set the cap for annual emissions. 
40
 At 130% of the cost of acquiring an EEU during the first 3 years and once the market mechanism applies, the 
charge will be double the average price of units for the year. 
41
 Alternatively Australian Carbon Credit Units (“ACCU”) may be surrendered, up to a cap of 5% of the emission 
obligations during the fixed price period. ACCUs are generated through certain farming and forestry activities – the 
carbon farming initiative. This initiative commenced in December 2011 and provides for credits to be issued on the 
basis of approved projects that reduce or avoid greenhouse gas emissions and/or increase carbon storage or 
sequestration: see http://www.daff.gov.au/climatechange/cfi (last visited 5 October 2012). 
42
 In general EEUs equal to 75% of the estimated (or the preceding year’s) liability are to be surrendered by 20 June 
with the balance by 1 February of the subsequent year. 
43
 For example, steel, aluminum, glass, paper, zinc, cement clinker and urea production industries. 
44
 Only in the first four years and up to a cap and subject to passing certain criteria. 
45
 Compensation to households range from increased social security payments and family assistance to tax rate cuts 
and other tax reduction measures. Small businesses also received assistance in the form of accelerated tax 
deductions. Other related measures include the availability of $40m AUD of energy-efficiency grants, a $240m 
AUD fund to assist small businesses to reduce their energy consumption and, over six years, a $1b AUD clean 
technology investment program for capital expenditure on energy-efficient technology in certain industries.  
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In the following section the key features of the regime will be discussed in greater detail and 
their rationale examined. 
4. The politics of implementation: price setting, exclusions and 
compensation  
The regime is the product of a political bargain. Explanations and justifications for how the 
fundamental aspects of the regime were arrived at are attempted below: 
Carbon tax or emissions trading scheme 
The debate as to the most appropriate mechanism was noted earlier. The hybrid reflects a view 
that Australia needs to be part of a global market for carbon permits that the Government hopes 
will exist by 2015. Until then the regime operates as a carbon tax which avoids the potential for 
price volatility in the carbon price. This has plagued the European Union ETS with the carbon 
price at one time falling dramatically when the market reacted to a view that there had been an 
oversupply of free permits. Price volatility was also especially a risk in the short term while the 
scheme remained the subject of controversy and threats to repeal it. Ensuring a minimum ceiling 
for the carbon price both has the effect of maintaining the impetus for behavioral change, 
especially by providing assurance to those contemplating low carbon investments, and protecting 
government revenues.  
The carbon price 
The hybrid nature of the regime required the Government to set the initial price. This exercise 
involved a tradeoff between the environment and the economy. It was inevitable that proponents 
of the two sides would be unsatisfied with the outcome. Business interests pointed to the price at 
which carbon permits were trading in Europe (around $15 AUD) whilst environmentalists 
pointed to analysis that suggested a price around $130 AUD was necessary to drive a move to 
renewable energy sources. Ultimately the price of $23 AUD accepts a need for carbon to be 
priced but at a level that the Government hopes will not damage the economy and lead to 
massive carbon leakage. 
Large emitter threshold 
The regime applies to “large” emitters, namely entities that emit 25,000 metric tonnes 46  of 
carbon dioxide annually (or the equivalent)
47
 with entities required to calculate emissions and be 
subject to audit. The Government has stated that this should account for around 60% of 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. The logic behind the threshold is to not burden smaller 
emitters with the cost and administration imposed by the regime, although those close to the 
threshold will still need to be able to verify that their emissions level does not exceed it. Notably 
the Clean Energy Regulator downgraded the list of affected entities from a projection of more 
                                                 
46 
Some landfill operators emitting 10,000 tonnes or more and certain natural gas retailers are also caught. Entities 
may also elect to opt-in to the regime to avoid the payment of taxes such as the fuel excise. The scheme contains 
provisions directed at schemes splitting emissions over different entities in an attempt to fall below the threshold. 
47
 The ETS applies to four of the six greenhouse gases acknowledged in the Kyoto Protocol. 
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than 500 (initially 1,000) to only 294 just prior to the regime taking effect.
48
 The science of 
measuring emissions is still being developed. One particular difficulty is that whilst fugitive 
emissions are caught (essentially the gas that escapes during (coal) mining operations) the 
measurement of such emissions is especially problematic.
49
 
Exemption for the agricultural sector 
The agricultural sector was exempted albeit that it is the country’s third largest emitter. Various 
justifications for this have been given including the difficulty of measuring emissions on farms,
50
 
the fact that the industry is a price taker and could not pass on the added costs
51
 and that the 
concession was necessary to obtain the support of the independents on whom the Government 
relies.
52
 Gasoline was also exempted but large diesel and jet fuel users are to be subject to 
increases in excise taxes.
 53
 
Emissions intensive trade exposed (“EITE”) industries 
EITE industries (such as steel, aluminum, zinc and glass production) are to receive substantial 
assistance in the form of free units covering up to 94.5% of their liability during the first three 
years, although this assistance will taper off at 1.3% per annum reflecting a carbon productivity 
contribution. The steel industry is to receive added assistance to encourage innovation and 
efficiency whilst the natural gas industry is also to receive a special 50% assistance level. The 
coal sector is to receive special assistance to help the transition away from the most emissions 
intensive coal mines whilst an energy security fund is to be established to provide some 
assistance to the electricity generation sector. These aspects of the regime all reflect the 
Government’s concern not to damage the economy with a too greater initial shock but rather to 
allow high emitting industries critical to the economic health of the nation time to introduce 
measures to reduce their exposure.  
On the other side of the equation the Government is also supporting the nascent clean energy 
industry. The most significant proposal is the establishment of the Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation to be set up to increase investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency and other 
low emissions technology. The Government has been active to promote the opportunities that the 
introduction of the scheme has for those wishing to be part of the vanguard of a new clean 
energy industry. 
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The level of assistance to EITE industries is particularly controversial and problematic. Whilst 
the rationale is to encourage the continuation of domestic production and prevent carbon leakage 
it has been argued that the assistance is excessive leading to windfall gains to these industries, 
the damaging of the environmental effectiveness of the regime by reducing incentives and 
increasing the cost of carbon reduction elsewhere in the economy.
54
 This is not to say that 
properly designed assistance to EITE industries may not be appropriate and necessary. As was 
noted earlier, the alternative of a border adjustment mechanism suffers from legal uncertainty in 
terms of compliance with GATT principles, administrative costs and calculation difficulties and 
could lead to international trade disputes and protectionism. Until international agreement and 
acceptance of such a mechanism is achieved the approach adopted in Australia of a free 
allocation of units is likely to be the preferred approach to counter carbon leakage.
55
 
Compensation and managing price rises 
Whilst it was acknowledged, and indeed is the rationale for the scheme, that the price of certain 
products in the market place would rise, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(“ACCC”) is to take action against any price gouging claimed falsely to be as a result of the 
introduction of the regime. Certainly it was anticipated that the price of electricity would rise but 
businesses intending on passing on additional costs to consumers are required to be able to 
substantiate that this is a result of the carbon measures if this is, in fact, what they claim. Given 
the potential for the electricity price rises to challenge the community’s resolve to put a price on 
carbon
56
 the Government initiated a marketing offensive to defray concerns as to the significance 
of the carbon price on electricity prices:
57
 see appendix 1. 
Although there is contention over whether the initial set price of $23 AUD a tonne is too low (to 
encourage a change in behavior or investment in clean energy) or too high (compared to other 
regimes and hence damaging the international competitiveness of Australian businesses) 
forecasts suggest that it will flow through as a 5 – 10% increase in the price of electricity and 
gas, 0.5 – 2% increase in the price of steel, aluminum and cement and 0 – 0.5% increase in the 
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cost of waste removal services, water, fuel, chemicals and paper.
58
 These price rises are 
promoted by the Government as modest and more than offset by the increased compensation to 
some businesses and households. Whilst the Opposition suggests that the ETS and its counter 
veiling compensation measures will simply generate a pointless money churn the Government 
argues that cashed up households will spend their extra funds wisely focusing on those industries 
and products that are able to avoid price rises through clean energy investment and/or energy 
savings. Market forces will, therefore, accelerate the desired change in behavior. 
Although the Opposition mounted a scare program in the lead up to 1 July 2012,
59
 price 
monitoring in the months following identified little impact from the ETS.
60
 Admittedly these 
were early days and it might be expected that any flow on effect will take some time to work its 
way through to retail prices. There were, however, a number of grievous and well publicized 
attempts to profit gouge blaming the carbon tax identified by the ACCC.
61
 There were also 
businesses that were rumored to have sacked workers, closed down or moved offshore in 
response partly, at least, to the introduction of the measures with small business reportedly 
particularly affected due to their apparent inability to be able to pass on the additional costs 
arising from the carbon price.
62
 
Presumably the Government hopes that the package as a whole sufficiently sugar coats the 
introduction of a carbon price so that both the economy (and the Government) can survive the 
experience. At the same time the measures must not be that unobtrusive that they do not bring 
about the desired behavioral change. Only time will tell although on 18 October the Government 
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announced that carbon emissions from electricity generation had fallen since the introduction of 
the measures, although at the same time arguing that the carbon price had only marginally 
contributed to a rise in electricity prices.
63
 The Government is, it seems, having it both ways. 
5. Is there really an Australian carbon pricing spring and, if so, will it 
prevail? 
The lingering effects of the global economic crisis stymied the nascent attempts by some World 
leaders to rise above the disappointments of the Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban climate 
change conferences and actually implement a fiscal response to climate change. Australia has 
been a star exception, albeit that the country only contributes 1.5% of the global greenhouse gas 
emissions.
64
 This raises the question as to why has the country proceeded down a path so many 
other countries have shied away from?  
The answer is one of political necessity. Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s non-carbon tax 
pledge, decimation at the 2010 polls saw the Government only retain power with the aid of the 
Greens on whose insistence the implementation of a carbon price became Government policy. 
Furthermore, it could be suggested that the regime is mere window dressing - an attempt to look 
as if the Government is doing something. Given Treasury estimates that a price around $131 
AUD per tonne is necessary to meet the Government’s greenhouse gas reduction targets, 65 
something politically inconceivable, it is difficult to see how a price of $23 AUD per tonne will 
generate sufficient financial imperative to steer the economy towards a renewable energy future. 
If there is likely to be one real effect of the Government’s climate change reforms it may be to 
lock the economy into an alternative fossil fuel, namely gas-fired power rather than the more 
polluting coal-fired power.
66
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The likelihood of the failure of the pricing to be able to achieve the outcome pleaded for by the 
scientists may be exacerbated by other design features.
67
 Notable of these are the limited 
application of the tax to 294 big polluters (1,000 was the initial plan),
68
 the exclusions for some 
industries and sectors (notably agriculture), the free units for trade exposed high polluting 
entities (shielding them from up to 94.5% of their liability) and the massive household 
compensation scheme that will see nine out of ten households receiving some compensation, 
many in excess of the anticipated impact on them.
69
 The combined effect of these features is that 
the regime will not be revenue neutral for the Government, at least initially. Whilst the rationale 
of the compensation is to soften its introduction, the Government must surely be looking towards 
the long term. For carbon pricing to generate the necessary behavioral changes the compensation 
package must eventually disappear into the inflation generated bracket creep and government 
policy change morass.
70
 
In any event, whether the Government’s carbon pricing mechanism (for what it is) has a long 
term future is uncertain. Whilst the weight of the science has apparently convinced most in the 
Opposition that climate change is real and manmade, the centre piece of their climate change 
policy is direct measures at tackling carbon emissions with a promise to repeal the ETS.  This 
threat to repeal the regime is significant given that the Opposition is expected to win the 
elections scheduled for late 2013.
71
 Even the mere threat is damaging enough to the policy aims 
of the regime. The Opposition has warned businesses not to purchase forward units in a scheme 
that will be closed down. Any investment decisions away from fossil fuels towards renewable 
energy need long term certainty and investment groups have slammed this approach of the 
Opposition as irresponsible and introducing political risk into the investment equation.
72
 
                                                 
67
 For a similar sentiment see: Evgeny Guglyuvatyy, “Australia’s carbon policy – a retreat from core principles” 
eJournal of Tax Research 10 (3) (2012): 552 - 572. 
68
 Jackson, “Fewer firms expected to pay carbon tax”, 1193. 
69
 $10.10 per week compensation for the average family as against an anticipated increase in costs of $9.90: The 
Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a clean energy future: The Australian Government’s climate change plan. 
70
 Passant, “Australia’s carbon tax – the sweet and the sour”, 12. 
71
 Australia must hold its next federal election by 30 November 2013.  
72
 David D. Stewart, “Australia. Investment groups praise carbon tax as opposition pledges repeal” Tax Notes 
International 65 (October 24, 2011): 254. 
 
19 
 
Of course, whether the Opposition will be elected (and have control of both houses of 
Parliament) cannot be taken for granted, even given their current lead in the polls.
73
 The current 
Opposition leader is as unpopular as the Prime Minister and liable to damaging gaffs.
74
 
Furthermore, whilst he has made a “pledge in blood” that he will repeal the regime 75  the 
international implications of such a move now that an agreement for mutual recognition of 
European units has been forged, the fact that domestic businesses may have, in fact, bought units 
in advance and the need to also unwind the massive compensation arrangements directed 
towards business and households, would make this a challenging proposition.  
6. Are there any lessons for Japan from the Australian experience? 
In recognition of the fact that it contributes 3.2% of the World’s greenhouse gas emissions,76 
under the Kyoto Protocol Japan committed to reducing its emissions by 6% relative to 1990 
levels by 2012. As an interim measure its 2010 Cancun pledge was to reduce emissions by 25% 
relative to 1990 by 2020. In the longer term the reduction target is 80% from 1990 levels by 
2050.  
Whilst a small scale voluntary ETS targeting small and medium sized businesses (“SMEs”) was 
commenced in 2005
77
 and a broader ranging voluntary experimental ETS in October 2008
78
 the 
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Japanese Government has procrastinated over how it might best achieve its Kyoto undertakings. 
As of February 2012 the Government was still reportedly reluctant to place a general price on 
carbon on economic and political grounds and had even admitted that its commitment to reduce 
emissions by 25% from 1990 levels was no longer viable.
79
  
Meanwhile, the OECD’s 2009 Economic Survey of Japan recommended that Japan should shift 
from a voluntary to a mandatory ETS based on a cap and trade that covered the whole economy 
drawing on lessons from other countries as well as its voluntary system. Furthermore, the design 
features should be such as to facilitate linking to those in other countries.
80
 Given these 
sentiments a consideration of the Australian mandatory economy wide ETS would seem 
particularly appropriate for Japanese policy analysts. 
The political economy of implementation 
Generally, whilst political economy theory predicts that broad ranging ETSs are almost 
impossible to introduce as the most influential political actors oppose carbon markets, some 
empirical studies have shown that under certain circumstances policy windows for the 
introduction of such systems may open.
81
 The Australian experience bears out this theory and 
illustrates the circumstances giving rise to such a window. 
The Australian carbon pricing mechanism is the product of ten years of heated political debate. It 
played a part in the demise of the country’s second longest serving conservative Prime Minister 
who took too long to accept the science. It saw the end of a conservative Opposition leader who 
fell on his sword trying to drag the skeptics in his party to an enlightened future. It hastened the 
end of one of the most popular Prime Ministers in Australian history
82
 who, after campaigning 
on a climate change response being the greatest moral challenge facing the country, failed in his 
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attempts to pass the legislation. It witnessed his successor campaign on the promise that no 
carbon tax would be introduced then, within six months, announce that the Government would 
proceed to introduce an ETS. Even now with the regime operating it remains controversial and 
its future uncertain.
83
 
Are there any lessons for other countries, and especially Japan, in the Australian experience? 
Clearly the introduction of such a regime is politically challenging. Vested interests, climate 
change skeptics and political opportunists abound. In the face of opposition how does a 
Government go about introducing such measures? Deceiving the electorate is one element of the 
Australian response which might be employed, but, it is suggested, only after very careful 
consideration. A steadfast assuredness of the need to act urgently and, hopefully, subsequently 
bring the community along would seem to be a prerequisite for such an approach although it is 
doubtful that the Australian Government had any loftier ideals than political expediency. The 
price for its deceit may soon be paid at the ballot box.  
This Australian “big bang” approach is contrasted with the incremental approach adopted in 
Japan. The introduction of narrowly focused voluntary regimes gradually intended to morph into 
an economy wide mandatory regime sounds reasonable, although such an approach was 
apparently forced on the Government by the refusal of the powerful industry groups to accept a 
mandatory regime with such groups now continuing to successfully insist on a deferral of the 
mandatory stage. A duplicitous approach may be necessary therefore, but it needs to be managed 
properly. Introducing the measures with a narrow application and at a low carbon pricing (if it is 
not to be market determined) is also more likely to be politically expedient. The intention to 
subsequently broaden the regime’s application and lift the price need not be (initially) made 
public. Public consultation on the specifics of the regime should play its part but on certain 
fundamental features the Government must signify that there is no room for compromise. 
Environment v economy tradeoff; compensational and behavioral change 
Any mechanism subsequently introduced in Japan must balance the protection of the 
environment with the protection of the economy. Australia has been fortunate in this regard. 
Whether it was the Chinese demand driven mining industry boom or the Government’s clever 
economic management that sheltered the economy from the ravages of the global financial crisis 
is unclear but what is clear is that the Australian economy is one of the few that has remained 
strong and so is better placed to absorb the shock of the introduction of a price on carbon. Even 
so, the price is not as high as environmentalists would wish and there are many concessions, 
exemptions and beneficiaries of free units. In particular, perceived critical and trade exposed 
high emitting industries are protected, at least in the short term. The provision of exemptions and 
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other largesse requires difficult tradeoffs in the face of intense lobbying by interest groups and 
all manner of wild claims about impending doom (both environmental and economic). Such 
concessions are a necessary feature of such a regime though, although best bounded by strict 
time lines for withdrawing the largesse and coupled with financial and other Government 
assistance to implement change. Whilst the Australian measures contain these features there will 
always be debate as to whether they are too generous or not generous enough. 
Of course, pricing carbon is all about achieving behavioral change. The speed at which this 
change can achieved is a product of the environment/economy tradeoff. There is no advantage in 
making the economy so unattractive to operate in that carbon emitting industries are driven 
offshore or frightened away – the so called carbon leakage. The exemptions and concessions in 
the form of the allocation of free units are directed at this concern. Furthermore, in this regard 
Australia has again been lucky as it is well placed as a desirable investment location.
84
 The cost 
of conducting business is only one consideration relevant to investment decisions by global 
investors.  
Once the carbon price and the excluded and supported industries are identified the measures 
must focus on the best way to achieve behavioral change for the bulk of the community. The 
Australian approach is, at least at first, an upstream one, to focus on the biggest polluters with the 
expectation that they will pass on the additional cost. The proceeds from the sale of units to the 
big polluters will flow into the compensation provided to other business (especially small 
business who are more likely to be price takers and unable to pass on these costs) and consumers. 
The theory is that consumers acting rationally will spend their increased wealth on utilities, 
products and services that are cheaper because their costing is impacted to a lesser extent by the 
price put on carbon, that is, were produced, distributed and/or provided using less carbon 
emitting processes. Therein lies the incentive for business to go green. 
Like most economic theories this is contentious and depends on many assumptions. Whilst the 
Government has attempted to explain the theory it can be expected that many in the community 
are still perplexed by the utility of this huge money churn apparently justifying nothing other 
than a new Government bureaucracy. Furthermore, real fears exist as to what the “rational” 
consumer might really do with their compensation. These fears were exacerbated by the fact that 
the first round of payments preceded the flow though effect of the carbon price becoming 
apparent (in fact, they even preceded the introduction of the carbon price). Speculation has 
ranged from that the money would simply be banked (maybe even used to pay down debt) to that 
it would immediately be splurged on the latest internet ready 3D super high definition plasma 
TV out of China. Whilst either response may sound rational to many, neither are the responses 
on which the measures are predicated. 
A further possibility, which presumably the Government’s economists consider irrational, is that 
consumers will continue to spend in exactly the same way simply using the compensation to 
meet the price increases generated by the carbon price. That the Government suspects that this 
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hugely undesirable outcome is a possibility is the basis for Passant’s suggestion that the 
compensation is designed to eventually fall below parity with the cost of the carbon price and, 
ultimately in fact, fade into obscurity. Hence the justification for his proposition that the ETS 
will result in a decline in the living standards of working people.
85
 Certainly this may be true if 
there is not an attendant adoption of measures by industry that will see it eventually be able to 
exclude the cost of carbon from its products and services. 
Whether or not the compensation regime is critical to the economic outcomes of the regime, it is 
fundamental to the political acceptability of the ETS. The Government hopes that the 
compensation package both blunts the Opposition’s threat to repeal the measures whilst shoring 
up community support. If the Government retains power in the 2013 elections or the Opposition 
subsequently retreats from its threat to repeal the regime it is arguable that this outcome could be 
substantially attributed to these generous compensation measures. 
Serendipity 
It must be asked why has an economy wide ETS been able to be introduced in Australia and not 
Japan notwithstanding that the Japanese Government and its Ministries have been considering 
the idea for a decade? After all, both countries have (at times) demonstrated an enthusiasm to 
take a World leadership role in the response to climate change.  
The Japanese intransience might be attributable to both the power of industry lobby groups and 
the nature of the power split between various Ministries with opposing mandates rendering it 
more difficult to implement a policy crossing ministerial boundaries. Undoubtedly the sluggish 
economy and the triple disasters of 2011 have also played a part in delaying the introduction of 
an ETS. 
Whilst Australia has maintained a vibrant economy throughout this period and there have been 
no natural disasters of the magnitude as that impacting on Japan, both the anti-ETS business 
lobby and the ministerial power split factors were also at play. Additionally, until 2007 the 
Government was comprised primarily of climate change skeptics who saw no need for such 
measures and took the view that, in any event, as a major exporter of fossil fuels the country had 
too much to lose by encouraging a price on carbon. Such skeptics were emboldened by the 
argument that even though Australians emit the highest amount of greenhouse gases per capita 
than anyone else in the World, in absolute terms the amount was so small that it would make no 
difference whilst the possible adverse effects of “going it alone” on a price taker export 
dependent economy were considerable. 
The power of the anti-ETS lobby was also well demonstrated in Australia by its contribution to 
the removal of both an Opposition leader and a Prime Minister with both their replacements 
expressing a no carbon price policy. However serendipity was to play its part. A hung Parliament, 
only resolved by a power sharing agreement with the Greens in both Houses of Parliament was 
to see an ETS introduced, against the tide of both mainstream public sentiment and the policies 
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of the major parties. The ETS was thus born from a fortuitous and unique set of circumstances 
rather than as the result of a strong Government policy supported by the mandate of the people. 
Future linkages 
Greater efficiency in carbon markets are achieved where the market is bigger or it is linked to 
other markets. Indeed the Australian Government had always envisaged that its ETS would need 
to be linked to other schemes, such as the EU regime.  
Both the Australian and any future Japanese carbon market will be price takers when linked to 
larger markets like the EU and any future Chinese or US economy wide market. It is critical, 
therefore, that not only must the design features of the regime be established with a view to not 
generating barriers to bilateral linking but that each country must carefully review the features of 
other trading schemes before linking to them. It might be expected, therefore, that Japanese 
analysts will wish to carefully monitor the progress towards the linking of the Australian scheme 
with that of the EU (and New Zealand).
86
 
Conclusion: an irrelevant discourse 
The introduction of an ETS in Australia has been accompanied by a saga of political intrigue. 
Political careers have been destroyed (or at least set back). Backroom deals done to secure power. 
Whether it will achieve the necessary environmental objectives remains to be seen but the 
politics of implementation have caused many to doubt the effectiveness of the regime given the 
quantification of the carbon price, number of exemptions and the extent of free permits issued to 
(so called) high emitting trade exposed entities. In particular, there is the (initial) setting of the 
carbon price at $23 AUD per tonne, in contrast to the Government’s own Treasury estimates of 
$131 AUD per tonne as necessary to meet the country’s greenhouse gas reduction targets. There 
is a real concern that the Australian regime is merely a cynical attempt by the Government to be 
seen to have done something albeit that the regime may achieve nothing in terms of greenhouse 
gas reductions. In any event, the regime has a tenuous future. 
Developments in Japan are even less sanguine. Whilst some additional taxes have been imposed 
on fossil fuels, with the anticipated effect to increase the price of fuel by one yen per litre
87
 this 
tax is hardly likely to achieve any environmental objectives in terms of an incentive to reduce 
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fuel consumption. Meanwhile the introduction of an economy wide mandatory ETS seems as far 
away as ever. With the controversy over the current Government’s plan to double the 
consumption rate tax to 10% (from 2015) there appears to be little appetite for the introduction of 
further imposts on the community.  
As the author writes the conclusion for this paper it is hoped that it is not merely a further 
contribution to what Earth and paleo-climate scientist Andrew Glickson has termed the 
“irrelevant discourse”. In his view it is all too late. He advocates the proposition that the political 
and economic fury over the carbon price and appropriate mechanism has obscured the 
fundamental issue that we should be considering, namely the catastrophic consequences for the 
world 3 to 4 degrees warmer by 2100.
88
 We can only hope that he is mistaken. 
  
                                                 
88
 Andrew Glikson, The Faustian bargain – while we debate the numbers, the planet suffers, The Conversation 
(online) (27 July 2011), available at http://the conversation.edu.au/the-faustian-bargain-while-we-debate-the-
numbers-the-planet-suffers-2512 (last visited 5 October 2012). 
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